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This article examines the impact of populism on environmental politics, focusing on 
countries’ outcome-level performance. I develop the argument that populist leadership likely 
undermines environmental quality. First, populist leaders tend to reject and refrain from 
implementing “green” policies as these are usually promoted by “corrupt elites.” Second, 
populism erodes democratic institutions, thus offsetting a series of mechanisms that are 
related to better environmental outcomes. Empirically, I combine data from the Global 
Populism Database covering 66 countries and more than 200 executive leaders with 
information on environmental performance at the outcome level. The findings suggest that 
populist leadership is strongly linked to lower environmental performance – also when 
controlling for a series of alternative influences and distinguishing between left and right-
wing populism. This research greatly adds to our understanding of the determinants of 




The study of populism, its emergence, and consequences has become one of the most 
influential fields in the social sciences (e.g., Akkerman et al. 2014; Bos et al. 2013; Busby et 
al. 2019; de la Torre 2015; Caramani 2017; Hameleers et al. 2017; Hobolt 2016; Oliver and 
Rahn 2016; Rooduijn 2019; Rooduijn et al. 2016; Castanho Silva et al. 2018; 2020; Van 
Hauwaert et al. 2020; Wuttke et al. 2020). Commonly, populism is defined as “a thin-centered 
ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and 
antagonistic groups, the people and the corrupt elite, and which argues that politics should be 
an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people (Mudde 2004, 543).” 
Populism is thus not tied to specific ideological positions and there are both left-wing and 
right-wing movements (Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017; Otjes and Louwerse 2015; Akkerman 
et al. 2017; Huber and Ruth 2017; Huber and Schimpf 2017; Taggart 2002; Forchtner and 
Kølvraa 2015). Three main criteria constitute the core of its definition: anti-elitism, people-
centrism, and a Manichean discourse that actively proclaims a moral struggle between “good 
people” and “the elite” (Hawkins 2003; Mudde 2004; Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2018; see also 
Canovan 1981; Huber and Schimpf 2015). Hence, populism essentially is anti-politics, 
claiming to pursue a new morale (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012, 8) as it opposes the 
establishment and “corrupt elites” – the actors generally seen at the center of political 
decision-making and power (Hay and Stoker 2009; Huber 2020). 
 
Populism influences political attitudes, behavior, and action in numerous ways (Doyle 2011; 
Panizza 2000; Roberts 2007; Huber 2020). For instance, there is work on immigration 
policies (Akkerman 2012), polarization (Rooduijn et al. 2016), or liberal democracy (Huber 
and Schimpf 2015). Environmental politics also increasingly acknowledges the power of 
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populism. Addressing environmental problems, including climate change as one of the most 
pressing policy issues of our time, is a key challenge. Effectively improving environmental 
quality needs significant and costly changes in the behavior of all actors – even down to the 
individual. The technical nature of such issues and their solutions, however, make 
environmental politics an easy target for populists (Oliver and Rahn 2016). Existing research 
on populism and the environment is dominated by micro-level analysis on public opinion, 
attitudes, and populist views of individuals. For instance, Huber et al. (2020) examine how 
populist attitudes are related to views on climate change mitigation (also Huber 2020). And 
Lockwood (2008) provides a theoretical framework that links populism and attitudes toward 
the environment: according to him, populists oppose pro-environmental ideas as 
corresponding policies threaten job security in low-skilled manufacturing and populism 
directly appeals to audiences here. Right-wing populism, in particular, is against 
environmental policies as it assumes more conservative, nationalist values, which see cross-
country responses to environmental threats potentially compromising state sovereignty. What 
is missing in this literature is a large-scale, comparative, and systematic assessment of how 
populism can influence environmental politics. 
 
Using a uniquely compiled data set, I address this shortcoming both theoretically and 
empirically as I study the impact of populist leadership1 on environmental performance at the 
outcome level. I develop an argument via two mechanisms. On one hand, populism, in light 
of its anti-elitist approach, portrays decision-makers, public institutions, scientists, or activists 
promoting environmental-friendly policies as “detached” and “corrupt” elites failing to meet 
the needs of the general will. Environmental politics tend to be rather abstract and technical, 
and the “populist backlash against globalization” (Huber 2020, 2; Norris and Inglehart 2018) 
focuses on precisely this. In turn, environmental politics is simply diminished as an elite 
project (Huber 2020), and populist leaders likely reject and refrain from implementing 
environmental-friendly policies as these are usually promoted by those that populist leaders 
have campaigned against in the last election. On the other hand, populism erodes democratic 
institutions, thus offsetting a series of mechanisms that are related to better environmental 
outcomes. Empirically, I combine data from the Global Populism Database (Hawkins et al. 
2019) with information on environmental outcomes and find that populist leadership is 
strongly linked to lower environmental performance. 
 
Several important policy implications follow from this research. Most crucially, this study 
adds to the existent work reporting that populism may indeed be associated with normatively 
negative policy outcomes. Recently, scholars suggest that populist leaders are a liability in the 
fight against COVID-192 and I show that this also applies in another, public-good related 
context: the environment. In order to effectively fight climate change and to improve 
environmental quality, voting populists into power is an ill-advised choice against the 
background of my research. And, indeed, anecdotal evidence supports this conclusion: the 
outgoing US President Donald Trump is widely seen as a populist (Bonikowski 2019). The 
Washington Post estimates that his administration “rolled back more than 125 environmental 
safeguards,”3 while the New York Times concludes that one of Trump’s legacies will be that 
“much of the damage to the climate [caused by his administration] cannot be reversed.”4 By 
implication, this work informs voters about the success and effectiveness of populist 
 
1 Specifically, I focus on political executives. This does not imply, however, that junior coalition partners or 
pressure groups at the grass-roots, e.g., Extinction Rebellion, cannot be “populists” or that they are without 
influence. I return to this issue in the conclusion. 
2 See online at: https://theconversation.com/are-populist-leaders-a-liability-during-covid-19-135431.  
3 See online at: https://tinyurl.com/yy95ymoa.   




leadership: while populists may claim to represent the general will and promise policies that 
are popular among large segments of the electorate, they are ultimately unlikely to address the 
most pressing policy issues of our time in a successful manner, including climate change and 
(global) environmental problems.  
 
This research further enhances our understanding of the determinants of environmental 
policies, the role of regime type and ideology, as well as populism and its consequences. First, 
there is a vast amount of studies focusing on the determinants of environmental performance, 
which improve our knowledge of what factors may facilitate or hamper environmental-
friendly outcomes. However, the influence of populism has been overlooked so far, although 
– as I demonstrate below – its impact is both significant and substantial. I thus broaden the 
scope of the literature by introducing populism to the study of environmental performance at 
the macro level. Second, and related to the first point, there are plenty of works on the link 
between regime type and environmental performance. Although some suggest that more 
democratic regimes or more left-wing ideologies are “better” for the environment, results are 
generally largely mixed and do depend on contextual conditions. This ambiguity about the 
influences stemming from regime type and political ideology may suggest that there is a 
missing component, which has not been fully integrated in existing theoretical and empirical 
models. I contend that populism could be this missing aspect, also as is orthogonal to 
ideology and “traditional” forms of government. Third, while there is research on the 
consequences of populism and populist attitudes, including on environmental public opinion, 
thus far we lack a comprehensive and systematic analysis of how populism affects 
environmental performance at the macro level. I provide such an assessment, thereby 
contributing to the emerging field of studies focusing on the impact of populism. 
 
 
Regime Type, Ideology, Populism, and the Environment – A Brief Review 
 
This research builds upon and extends previous works on regime type, ideology, and – more 
recently – populism and environmental politics. In the following, I briefly discuss each of 
these strands, thereby highlighting where and how my study contributes to the literature. First, 
there are several works focusing on regime type and environmental performance. On one 
hand, some scholars suggest that democracies more strongly promote green policies and are 
linked to better environmental performance (Congleton 1992; Payne 1995; Li and Reuveny 
2006; Bernauer et al. 2013). The mechanisms behind this relationship argue that democracy is 
characterized by more civil liberties (Payne 1995), which allow citizens to be more informed 
about environmental problems and governmental policies. Second, civil liberties also 
comprise opportunities to express opinions and organize movements to lobby executives. 
Ultimately, domestic audiences in democracies can impose higher audience costs on leaders 
and are able to remove them from power more easily than in non-democratic polities.  
 
Consistent with this argument, the “median voter” is decisive for the provision of public 
goods in democracies (Congleton 1992; McGuire and Olson 1996; Niskanen 1997; Lake and 
Baum 2001). Democratic political leaders want to satisfy their constituencies’ policy demands 
as this is necessary for obtaining or retaining office (Downs 1957). Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
(2013) argue here that democracies outperform non-democratic regimes in the provision of 
public goods as this is a more cost-efficient way to satisfy the electorate in this context. The 
median voter in a democracy “incurs lower marginal costs of public goods provision, relative 
to the average member of the economic and political elite in a non-democracy” (Bernauer et 
al. 2013, 95). In turn, democratic governments have strong incentives to invest in public 




environmental policies: democratic politicians react to what the public wants due to the 
central incentive to stay in power (also Page and Shapiro 1983; Dahl 1956; Downs 1957; 
Arrow 1963). In other words, democratic political leaders are responsive to domestic 
audiences; they resort to the provision of public goods to ensure political support and survival 
in office. The environment may not be an exception here and democratic governments then 
invest more in the public good of “environmental quality” (see also Bernauer and Koubi 
2009; Dasgupta and De Cian 2018). 
 
There are several studies that focus on governments’ ideological positions and environmental 
politics. Ideology is strictly speaking independent of regime type as such, although empirical 
analyses naturally focus on democracies when examining the influence of right-wing or left-
wing ideologies of political parties and governments. Early evidence points toward a positive 
impact of more left-wing executives and environmental performance both at the output and 
the outcome level (Tobin 2017; Chang, Lee, and Berdiev 2015; Jahn 2016). While the 
specific mechanisms for this relationship may vary, arguments converge on “equality, 
distributional concerns, and market skepticism” (Neumayer 2003, 203) as being core aspects 
that define left-wing political ideology, which are also likely conducive to environmental 
quality and policies promoting this. For example, Neumayer (2003; 2004) argues that poorer 
individuals and the working class are affected the most by environmental problems. Leftist 
parties, once in power, seek to address this with adequate policies, which eventually promote 
environmental quality.  
 
That said, neither the democracy-environment link nor the positive association between left-
wing ideology and environmental performance are robust. In fact, empirical results are mixed, 
and ambiguity persists about how the form of government and ideology, respectively, are 
related to environmental performance in a consistent fashion. Ward (2008), for example, 
shows that democracies may have a better environmental output than other forms of 
government, but their outcome performance depends on the specific indicator examined. In 
terms of ideology, the positive effect of left-wing positions is largely driven by the actual pro-
environmental views of parties and governments – but not leftist ideologies per se (Jahn 1998; 
Knill, Debus, and Heichel 2010; Ward and Cao 2012, Schulze 2014. Leinaweaver and 
Thomson 2016). There is also some evidence linking more right-wing ideologies to 
environmental quality as right-wing parties have begun to take over some of the more 
traditional policy positions of green parties (Garmann 2014). Gassebner et al. (2011), one of 
the most comprehensive reviews in this literature, conclude that there is no robust direct effect 
of left-wing ideology on environmental outcomes.  
 
A number of works have emerged that examine populism in the context of environmental 
politics (Dasgupta and De Cian 2018; Beeson 2019). Huber (2020), for instance, makes use of 
the British Election Study and identifies a strong link between populist views and climate 
skepticism. Lockwood (2018) proposes a theoretical framework linking populist attitudes and 
environmental politics. On one hand, this framework comprises a structuralist explanation, 
which is based on the economic and political marginalization of the society’s globalization 
losers. On the other hand, there is an ideological explanation highlighting that right-wing 
populists see climate action as a project of a “cosmopolitan elite,” going against the interests 
of “the people.” Lockwood’s work, though inspiring in many ways, is only theoretical and 
does not empirically test its propositions. Huber et al. (2020) fielded surveys in the US and 
they demonstrate that populism affects people’s climate attitudes – the more populist one’s 
views, the more skeptic they are of policies fighting climate change. The main argument of 
this research is based on the “chain of delegation” as the core of populist criticism: “populists 




their own interests. Thus, the central actors in policy making, ‘the people,’ are mostly left out 
of the process” (Huber et al. 2020, 5). This degree of responsiveness, and especially the lack 
thereof, shapes individuals’ support for climate policies. Huber et al. (2020) also report that 
populism moderates the impact of partisanship.  
 
In sum, this overview highlights several limitations, which this study seeks to address. First, 
my discussion of two important strands in the literature – one on democracy and 
environmental politics and a second focusing on ideology – highlights that neither forms of 
government nor specific ideologies are robustly and consistently linked to environmental 
performance. Some element is missing in these debates and populism may well be this 
overlooked component as it is orthogonal to ideology and regime type. When considering 
populism in our study of environmental performance, therefore, we may shed light on 
persistent inconsistencies in empirical patterns and greatly add to our understanding of the 
drivers behind environmental quality. Second, there are important theoretical works and 
micro-level evidence on populism and environmental public opinion, but we lack a large-




Populist Leaders and Environmental Outcomes – Theory  
 
The argument I develop is based on the definition of populism introduced above. In addition, 
due to my focus on political leaders, I assume that state executives have the key incentive to 
stay in power once office is assumed (Huber and Schmipf 2015). That is, populist leaders will 
seek to please the domestic audience for increasing the chances of re-election, also by seeking 
to mobilize “groups outside the system and attach new weight to their problems and particular 
issues” (Huber and Schmipf 2015, 3; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012, 21). Against the 
background of these assumptions, I contend that populism likely has a detrimental impact on 
environmental quality. 
 
Environmental Policies and “Corrupt Elites” 
 
The first theoretical mechanism linking populist leadership to states’ environmental 
performance is based on the abstract nature of environmental politics (Huber 2020). The 
drivers behind environmental problems as well as the consequences of environmental 
degradation are usually rather complex. Easy solutions to such problems are oftentimes not 
given. While it nevertheless remains vital that actors down to the individual alter their 
behavior, convincing them to do so is challenging if problems are abstract to begin with and 
solutions neither straightforward nor simple (Spence et al. 2012). Weber (2016) stresses here 
that this increases the social distance between ordinary citizens and environmental politics. 
Moreover, most environmental problems are of a transnational nature, requiring responses 
across borders from more than one nation state at a time. Hence, coordinated efforts are 
discussed in international negotiations, regularly without the direct involvement of domestic 
audiences and interest groups, which further detaches environmental problem-solving from 
the “ordinary citizen.” 
 
It is because of this complex and transnational nature that populists portray environmental 
politics as elite-driven, distant from the will of the people and “ordinary citizens’ needs” 
(Huber 2020), and then oppose solutions to environmental degradation. By the same token, 
Huber (2020, 6) claims that environmental politics is only “of interest to richer and better-




Dunlap 1986; Freudenberg and Steinsapir 1991; Inglehart 1995; Wetts 2020). Lockwood 
(2018) contends as well that people tend to see environmental politics more like an elite-
driven and cosmopolitan issue area due to its more transnational nature. In turn, the general 
will is less concerned about or be able to influence environmental decision-making. This leads 
to a lack of responsiveness between elites and citizens’ demands, which populists exploit by 
claiming to be the only genuine representative of the people (Huber 2020; Huber et al. 2020; 
Caramani 2017). Busby et al. (2019) refer to this as “dispositional blame attribution.” This 
means that, as Huber et al. (2020, 2) conclude, “populist individuals are more likely to oppose 
the central actors involved in top-down climate policy (namely, the political elites that adopt 
climate policies) and are likely to reject climate-change-related mitigation policies proposed 
by the same actors.” 
 
Ultimately, the complexity surrounding environmental politics, a significant amount of 
uncertainty about its long-term implications (Spence et al. 2012; Weber 2016), as well as its 
transnational nature induce that populism frequently displays the environment as a top-down 
issue; and detached and corrupt elites who do not take the interests of the general will into 
account impose it (Castanho Silva et al. 2018; 2020; Hornsey et al. 2018). Populist attitudes 
thus tend to be more environmental-skeptic and opposed to protecting environmental quality. 
As Huber et al. (2020, 3) emphasize, the “antagonism between a good public and an evil elite 
represents a deeply populist claim” (also Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2018). Interestingly, 
populists reject not so much the environmental issue as such, but the fact that – as stressed by 
the complex and transnational character of environmental politics – these policies are pursued 
and implemented by elites who merely seek to further their own interests and not the general 
will of the people (Morrison and Dunlap 1986; Wetts 2020). The implication for populist 
leaders is then straightforward: once in power, they are unlikely to implement policies they 
campaigned against in the last election and doing so successfully as they have just gained 
office. In fact, pursuing such policies would decrease populist leaders’ chances of staying in 
office. In the end, those elites and their policies are the main opponents for populists – and 
environmental policies are not an exception. Populist leaders are thus unlikely to engage in 
pro-environmental legislative action; in fact, they may even promote policies that openly go 
against environmental protection. Consider, for example, Brazil’s President, Jair Bolsonaro, 
commonly portrayed as a right-wing populist, who “worked relentlessly and unapologetically 
to roll back enforcement of Brazil’s once-strict environmental protections”5 once in power. In 




Populism and Undermining Institutions 
 
As discussed above, the empirical evidence for a robust link between democracy and 
environmental performance is mixed. However, when assuming a more disaggregated view, 
there are some, predominantly democratic, institutions that are commonly found to be 
conducive to environmental protection and quality: checks and balances as well as the process 
of finding a compromise in legislative action. First, political constraints or checks and 
balances pertain to institutional factors or actors in the political system that can prevent a 
choice from being made, i.e., a change from the status quo is averted and only the consent of 
the veto player can alter this (Tsebelis 1995; 1999). Second, compromise or a more inclusive 
political system is defined by “the proportion of the population entitled to participate on a 
more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of the government” (Dahl 
 




1971, 4). Both of these features may, at first, seem more like an obstacle to decision-making, 
including environmental politics, and thus a challenge for improving environmental 
performance.  
 
However, more inclusive political systems in which all citizens can participate in 
environmental decision-making reaching compromise to enact policies are increasingly seen 
as a necessary condition for achieving sustainability (Böhmelt et al. 2016). While decision-
making may take more time, inclusiveness and compromise allow environmentally aware 
citizens to channel their demands effectively, and they ensure that even ordinary citizens are 
being heard (Böhmelt et al. 2016, 1272-1273). Therefore, inclusiveness and compromise are 
key factors for achieving better environmental outcomes. A similar pattern is given for veto 
players and political constraints: while more checks and balances make “it difficult to 
implement far-reaching, but probably most effective climate change policies,” systems 
characterized by more political constraints produce “politics of small steps that are supported 
by a broad political elite” (Stadelmann-Steffen 2011, 485; also Poloni-Staudinger 2008). 
Conversely, with more political constraints in place, it is equally difficult to implement anti-
environmental policies that would lower environmental quality (Cao and Prakash 2012). 
 
Populist leadership, however, tends to undermine and erode both checks and balances as well 
as the principle of inclusiveness and compromise. Mainly driven by what Huber and Schimpf 
(2015, 4.) call an “anything goes mentality” (Hawkins 2003; Mudde 2004; Hawkins and 
Kaltwasser 2018; see also Canovan 1981; Huber and Schimpf 2015), populist leaders 
capitalize on the power they received from the popular sovereign and, once in office, seek to 
dismantle those institutions they perceive as dysfunctional – also because these institutions 
and processes are associated with the “corrupt elites” previously in power (Hawkins 2003). In 
turn, “populist leaders’ own assessment of the volonté générale becomes their prevailing point 
of reference for decision making” (Huber and Schimpf 2015, 4). Yet, as political constraints 
constitute an obstacle toward this, populist leaders will circumvent or remove them altogether. 
That is, having gained power based on the claim to represent the true political will and having 
removed the “corrupt elite” in the moral struggle between them and the populists’ “good 
people,” populist leaders may “change institutions as they see fit” (Huber and Schimpf 2015, 
4). 
 
What is more, this process goes hand in hand with a systematic exclusion of particular groups 
from decision-making, thus undermining compromise and inclusiveness. This is due to the 
moralization of politics, a key consequence of the Manichean discourse vested in populism 
(Hawkins 2003; Mudde 2004; Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2018; see also Canovan 1981; Huber 
and Schimpf 2015). Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012, 24) summarize accordingly that “populism 
in power leads to polarization and consequently defensive measures from the government.” 
Hence, despite the claim to represent the general will of the citizenry, large segments of the 
society are no longer part of the political decision-making process – compromise may no 
longer be possible or allowed for at all. Eventually, this second mechanism points into the 
same direction as the first one: environmental performance will decrease due to populist 
leadership as this undermines the (largely democratic) institutions of checks and balances as 







Figure 1.  
CO2 Emissions per capita – Median Spline 
 
Note: Graph prepared by author; figure shows distribution of outcome variable (metric tons per capita) across all 




Dependent Variable and Methodology 
 
I combine data on environmental outcomes with information on populist leadership. The latter 
is based on the Global Populism Database (GPD; Hawkins et al. 2019), and the spatio-
temporal coverage of these data drive the unit of analysis, countries, and years covered in my 
analysis. Specifically, the GPD focuses on state executives and heads of government, coding 
for each of their terms in office their degree of populism (defined below). I employ the leader 
term as the unit of analysis, e.g., there are two entries for Barack Obama in the data set (2009-
2013; 2013-2016). After accounting for missing values, I cover 66 countries and around 200 
executive leaders (depending on model specifications) between 1994 and 2016. 
 
The dependent variable of my analysis focuses on environmental performance at the outcome 
level. I employ per-capita CO2 emissions for the analyses presented below. While no single 
measure is ideal for all purposes, emissions per capita are extensively used in the literature as 
a proxy for environmental quality (e.g., Bernauer and Koubi 2009; Spilker 2012; Bernauer 
and Böhmelt 2013), also because of its wide spatio-temporal coverage. This research design 
choice is also justified from a substantive point of view as CO2 emissions constitute the major 
contributing factor of climate change and, in the long run, “the aim must be to reduce all 
countries’ absolute level of emissions” (Böhmelt et al. 2018, 438). Moreover, CO2 emissions 
per capita meet the essential criteria for any environmental-quality indicator, namely they are 




available abatement technologies for implementation of the regulations, and data are available 
for a large set of countries (Bernauer and Koubi 2009, 1358.). To this end, I rely on the 
Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Their 
data are available from the World Bank Development Indicators, with carbon dioxide 
emissions defined as those stemming from the burning of fossil fuels and the manufacture of 
cement, including emissions produced during the consumption of solid, liquid, and gas fuels 
and gas flaring. The final outcome variable captures emissions in metric tons per capita. 
Additional analyses in the appendix rely on alternative dependent variables in the form of an 
efficiency measure, a policy output measure, and a measure of ecological footprint. 
 
Figure 1 depicts the development of CO2 emissions across all sample countries in my 
observation period as a median spline. A closer inspection at the underlying data reveals that 
there is low within country variation for some states. I address concerns related to this in the 
appendix by jackknifing the sample. Given CO2 emissions as my dependent variable, I 
employ multi-level linear regression models that comprise fixed effects for years and random 
intercepts for leaders. This ensures that I control for any unobserved unit-level effects as well 
as temporal shocks. In the appendix, I consider modifications to this estimation strategy as I 




The main explanatory variable, Populism Score, is taken from the GPD (Hawkins et al. 2019). 
The basic idea behind the GPD is to code populist discourse for political leaders using textual 
analysis of political speeches. The project, according to its codebook, “applies a technique 
known as holistic grading which was designed by educational psychologists to measure 
diffuse, latent aspects of texts such as tone, style, and quality of argument. The technique […] 
has coders apply an integer grade scale and a rubric to identify rough attributes of texts at 
each grade.” Furthermore, “texts are initially assigned one of three scores: (2) A speech in this 
category is extremely populist and comes very close to the ideal populist discourse. 
Specifically, the speech expresses all or nearly all of the elements of ideal populist discourse 
and has few elements that would be considered non-populist; (1) a speech in this category 
includes strong, clearly populist elements but either does not use them consistently or tempers 
them by including non-populist elements. Thus, the discourse may have a romanticized notion 
of the people and the idea of a unified popular will (indeed, it must in order to be considered 
populist), but it avoids bellicose language or references to cosmic proportions or any 
particular enemy; and (0) a speech in this category uses few if any populist elements. Note 
that even if a speech expresses a Manichean worldview, it is not considered populist if it lacks 
some notion of a popular will.” 
 
The sample of texts is a quota sample consisting of four speeches for each term in office: a 
campaign speech (usually the closing or announcement speech), a ribbon-cutting speech 
(marking a commemorative event with a small, domestic audience), an international speech 
(given before an audience of foreign nationals outside the country), and a famous speech (one 
widely circulated that represents the leader at his or her best). My final variable, Populism 
Score, is the average populism value for each leader term across the four speeches coded. In 
total, this variable covers 275 leader terms, has an average value of 0.342, and ranges in 0-
1.92.  
 
For the control variables, I follow existing research on the determinants of environmental 
quality. First, I consider population, unemployment, and GDP per capita, which are all taken 




total population (log-transformed), which counts all residents regardless of legal status or 
citizenship (except for refugees not permanently settled). Unemployment is also log-
transformed and refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for 
and seeking employment. Finally, the log-transformed GDP per capita (in current US Dollars) 
is defined as the gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of 
gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus 
any subsidies not included in the value of the products. 
 
Second, I control for regime type and state capacity. The former is based on the polity2 score 
from the Polity IV data set (Marshall et al. 2019). This variable ranges between -10 and +10 
capturing perfect autocracies (minimum value) up to perfect democracies (maximum value). 
Controlling for regime type addresses those studies arguing for a relationship between forms 
of government and environmental performance. Recall, however, that my populism variable 
captures populism across the entire spectrum, i.e., left-right ideologies or democracies and 
autocracies. The state capacity control is taken from the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators. It captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of 
the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment 
to such policies. Larger values pertain to higher governmental effectiveness. Controlling for 
state capacity addresses the alternative mechanism that a high-quality bureaucracy, even with 
a highly populist leader, may ensure the effective implementation of existing rules and 
regulations, including environmental laws that promote environmental quality. 
 
Third, I incorporate two final controls pertaining to industrial output and a state’s integration 
into the global system, respectively. On one hand, industrial output is based on 
manufacturing, value added, as a percentage of GDP. Value added is the net output of a sector 
after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. This variable thus captures how “industry-heavy” a state’s economy is, with higher 
values standing for a larger manufacturing share and probably less environmental quality. On 
the other hand, domestic pollution is likely influenced as well by how integrated a country is 








Table 1 summarizes the main models: Model 1 is a standard model of environmental quality 
with CO2 Emissions as the dependent variable and the controls introduced above as 
explanatory variables. In Model 2, I add Populism Score but do not alter other specifications. 
In Model 3, I present a more parsimonious version of Model 2 as I only focus on the main 
explanatory variable and the most prominent controls used in the literature. All models 
comprise fixed effects for years and random intercepts for leaders, while the standard errors 
are also clustered at this latter level. The table entries are coefficients, which can be 
interpreted directly as marginal effects for a log-transformed outcome variable. To facilitate 
interpretation, I have calculated the predicted values of the outcome variable given the values 






Results from Mixed-Effects Regression 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Populism Score   0.112  0.127 
  (0.040)*** (0.043)*** 
Population (ln)  0.106  0.101  0.071 
 (0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.031)*** 
GDP per capita (ln)  0.487  0.484  0.554 
 (0.059)*** (0.057)*** (0.033)*** 
State Capacity -0.251 -0.209  
 (0.067)*** (0.067)***  
Unemployment (ln)  0.142  0.138  
 (0.041)*** (0.040)***  
Manufacturing -0.004 -0.005  
 (0.008) (0.008)  
Globalization  0.036  0.036  
 (0.008)*** (0.008)***  
Democracy -0.021 -0.019 -0.002 
 (0.010)** (0.011)* (0.010) 
Constant -6.372 -6.342 -4.065 
  (0.721)*** (0.702)*** (0.516)*** 
N 194 193 205 
Log Pseudolikelihood -61.409 -56.381 -80.281 
Random Intercept Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: Standard errors clustered on leaders in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% (two-tailed). 
 
I find strong and robust support for my theoretical expectations: populism likely harms the 
environment in that more populist leaders are more strongly associated with lower 
environmental quality. The core item Populism Score is positively signed in Models 2-3 and 
statistically significant, which suggests that there is a correlation between more CO2 
emissions and populism in the expected direction. Substantively, the coefficients emphasize 
that a one-unit increase in Populism Score leads to a rise in per-capita carbon emissions of 
12.9 (Model 2) to 13.6 percent (Model 3). In other words, the main variable’s impact is not 
























Figure 2.  
Effect of Populism on Environmental Outcomes 
 
Note: Graph prepared by author; dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates this as I plot predicted values of CO2 Emissions for Populism Score 
(holding all other variables constant at their means). Non-populist leaders are linked to per-
capita emissions of around 1.3, which translates into 3.67 metric tons per capita. Moving to a 
value of 1 for Populism Score, the predicted value of the outcome is 4.06 metric tons per 
capita and moving to the maximum of Populism Score is linked to 4.48 metric tons of carbon 
dioxide emissions per capita. Linking these results back to the theory, there is indeed 
systematic, cross-country evidence that populism induces lower environmental performance.  
 
The control variables largely show expected effects, but some of those merit further attention. 
First, larger states, economically stronger ones, and higher rates of unemployment are 
consistently associated with more carbon emissions, i.e., more environmentally detrimental 
outcomes. The marginal effect of GDP per capita (ln) is, in fact, one of the largest ones across 
the model estimations, which mirrors earlier findings in the literature. Also, countries more 
strongly embedded in the international system tend to emit more CO2. A one-unit increase in 
Globalization leads to an emissions rise of about 3.7 percent. The variable Manufacturing 
does not achieve conventional levels of statistical significance in any model, though. Finally, 
State Capacity and Democracy reveal some interesting findings in the context of populism. 
On one hand, the negative and significant estimate for State Capacity demonstrates that a 
high-quality bureaucracy is indeed “good” for the environment. Most importantly, though, 
adding this variable next to Populism Score in the models does not render the latter 
insignificant. This emphasizes that there is a genuine effect stemming from populism.  
 
Table 2. 
The Moderating Effect of Political Ideology – Results from Mixed-Effects Regression 
 
 Model 4 Model 5 
Populism Score  0.135  0.138 
 (0.044)*** (0.075)* 
Left-Wing  0.134  0.178* 
 (0.089) (0.103) 
Left-Wing * Populism Score  -0.079 
  (0.099) 
Liberals  0.158*  0.126 
 (0.091) (0.107) 
Liberals * Populism Score   0.024 
  (0.114) 
Population (ln)  0.070  0.071 
 (0.031)** (0.031)** 




 (0.032)*** (0.032)*** 
Democracy -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.009) 
Constant -4.254 -4.228 
  (0.523)*** (0.520)*** 
N 205 205 
Log Pseudolikelihood -78.754 -78.182 
Random Intercept Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Note: Standard errors clustered on leaders in parentheses; right-wing ideology left out as baseline category;               
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (two-tailed). 
 
On the other hand, the statistical significance of Democracy depends on specifications, 
although it is consistently negatively signed in Table 1. While it is significant in Models 1-2 
only, the overall pattern suggests that more democratic regimes tend to perform better 
environmentally. Again, including Populism Score next to this item does not affect my main 
result: populism has an independent impact on environmental performance, which is not 
driven by a state’s form of government. 
 
I also examined a moderating effect of ideology. Although populism is largely seen as 
orthogonal to left-right ideological positions (Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017; Otjes and 
Louwerse 2015; Akkerman et al. 2017; Huber and Ruth 2017; Huber and Schimpf 2017; 
Taggart 2002; Forchtner and Kølvraa 2015) and, indeed, the main characteristics of populism 
are the same across ideologies (Mudde 2004), scholars increasingly analyze the relationship 
between the two concepts (Otjes and Louwerse 2015; Akkerman et al. 2017; Huber and Ruth 
2017; Huber and Schimpf 2017). The theoretical rationale behind a moderating influence may 
be that right-wing populists define and see “the good people” and “corrupt elites” somewhat 
differently than left-wing populists. That is, the former have a “strong cultural and nativist 
aspect” in its discourse, while the latter’s discourse is mainly defined in economic terms 
(Forchtner and Kølvraa 2015: 199; Huber and Schimpf 2017). The GPD (Hawkins et al. 
2019) comprises a variable capturing the general ideology of a leader and distinguishes 
between left-wing, liberal/center ideologies, and right-wing positions. Using this information, 
I created three dichotomous variables for each category. Model 4 summarizes the modified 
specification of this and I leave right-wing ideologies out as the baseline for comparison. In 
Model 5, I also interact the binary ideology variables with Populism Score. Nonetheless, 
Table 2 presents only weak evidence for an influence of political ideology on environmental 
performance and I do not identify a strong moderating influence of this factor, since the 
interaction terms are statistically insignificant.   
 
Table 3. 
The Influence of Civil Society Strength 
 
 Model 6 
Populism Score  0.101 
 (0.047)** 
Civil Society Strength -0.482 
 (0.258)* 
Population (ln)  0.098 
 (0.028)*** 





State Capacity -0.183 
 (0.065)*** 









  (0.689)*** 
N 193 
Random Intercept Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Note: Standard errors clustered on leaders in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% (two-tailed). 
 
The research’s focus is on state leaders and their populist attitudes. This does not imply, 
however, that pressure groups at the grass-roots, e.g., Extinction Rebellion, cannot be 
“populists” or that they are without influence. While there is no systematic data on non-
governmental groups, social movements, and populism, I re-estimated my main model while 
including a variable on the strength of civil society. Clearly, this analysis does not capture 
populist grass-roots movements, but I can proxy some of the influence stemming from civil 
society on environmental politics. To this end, I rely on the Core Civil Society Index by the 
V-Dem data set:6 this variable provides “a measure of a robust civil society, understood as 
one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their 
political and civic goals, however conceived.” Higher values pertain to more autonomy and 
greater influence. When including this variable in the main model (see Table 3), the core 
result is basically unchanged: populism is associated with more emissions. At the same time, 
however, there is also some evidence that civil society can exert an influence in that I obtain a 
negative and significant estimate: the stronger the civil society in a country, the lower the 
emissions per capita. This mirrors existing findings on environmental non-governmental 
organizations in international regimes (e.g., Böhmelt and Betzold 2013). However, this is 
only a preliminary analysis and future work may examine more thoroughly the links between 
non-governmental groups, social movements, populism, and environmental quality. 
 
 





Figure 3.  
Effect of Populism on Environmental Outcomes Moderated by Globalization 
Note: Graph prepared by author; dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval. 
 
Finally, a state’s embeddedness in the international system influences its environmental 
performance. Ward (2006) examines the network of international regimes and finds that even 
non-environmental institutions could improve countries’ environmental quality “at home.” 
Spilker (2012) concentrates on the general network of environmental and non-environmental 
international organizations (IOs): according to her results, such IOs can be helpful, including 
by constraining leaders’ power to pursue less environmentally-friendly policies. Finally, Cao 
and Prakash (2012) study environmental performance with a view towards states’ 
embeddedness in the global trade network. Those and related works suggest that populist 
leaders might also be constrained by the international level or that they, once in power, ignore 
or fail to implement international commitments. To this end, I employ the KOF Globalization 
Index, which also comprises the number of IOs in which a country is member and the number 
of international treaties signed between two or more states and I interact it with Populism 
Score. Table 4 and Figure 3 stress that there is some evidence for a constraining effect 
stemming from the international level. 
 
Table 4. 
Robustness Checks: Moderation via Globalization 
 
 Model 7 
Populism Score  1.119 
 (0.272)*** 
Populism Score * Globalization -0.015 
 (0.004)*** 
Population (ln)  0.105 
 (0.028)*** 
GDP per capita (ln)  0.449 
 (0.047)*** 














  (0.713)*** 
N 193 
Random Intercept Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Note: Standard errors clustered on leaders in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% (two-tailed). 
 
That is, the theoretical range of Globalization is [0; 100] with higher values standing for more 
embeddedness in the international system. According to the interaction, the positive impact of 
Populism Score is significantly given and remains robust, but only for low to high values of 
Globalization. After a threshold has been passed, which is at around a value of 85 of 
Globalization, Populism Score is even negatively signed and statistically significant. Hence, 
similar to the domestic level, populists may have the incentive to overcome checks and 
balances as well as commitments internationally. Yet, the more embedded a country is 
internationally, the more difficult this becomes. In fact, Figure 3 suggests that populists are 
not successful at all in this, as the graph points to a highly constraining impact of the 





How is populism related to environmental politics? Previous research focuses more and more 
on the consequences of populism, “a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be 
ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, […] and which argues 
that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” 
(Mudde 2004, 543), also in the context of environmental politics. Existing work has mainly 
been of a theoretical nature or sought to assess the influence of populist attitudes on 
environmental views at the individual level. This article seeks to build on and extend these 
studies by providing the first systematic analysis of the impact of populist leadership on 
countries’ environmental performance at the outcome level. 
 
The theoretical argument is based on two mechanisms: one that focuses on populists’ 
rejection of elitist politics, which includes environmental politics; a second one concentrates 
on populists undermining political institutions that are usually favorable to better 
environmental performance. The empirical analysis based on quantitative data that combine 
leaders’ populist tendencies and environmental quality at the outcome level, as captured by 
CO2 emissions, provides strong and robust evidence for my claims: populism lowers 
environmental performance. A series of robustness checks in the appendix adds to the 
confidence in this result: I considered term fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable; I 




random effects in a regular OLS setup and the Arrelano-Bond estimator;7 I model a 
curvilinear effect stemming from income and I replaced the dependent variable by 
alternatives, i.e., a variable capturing environmental policy outputs, a measure on efficiency, 
and a variable on ecological footprint; I include a variable on veto players next to an 
estimation with jackknifed standard errors; I also model potentially moderating influences 
from regime type and single-party governments; and I take account of fossil fuel production. 
All additional models are summarized in the appendix and further support my main result. 
 
There are several policy implications and avenues for future research that emerge from this 
study. First, this research adds to those studies arguing for the ineffectiveness of populist 
leadership and, in turn, individuals’ electoral choices. Populists are, despite their claims, 
rather ineffective in providing public goods, including environmental quality. Large segments 
of the society are also systematically excluded from decision-making, which further hampers 
a deliberative environmental policy process. Hence, despite their promises, voters would be 
ill-advised to cast their vote for populists if they care about environmental performance. Even 
if they are skeptical about “current elites” in power, populists are unlikely to make things 
better and, in fact, the cure may well be worse than the disease here.  
 
Second, despite my focus on state leaders, it should not be ignored that other political parties, 
junior coalition partners, or non-governmental actors also have the potential to influence 
environmental politics in important ways (see, e.g., Betsill and Corell 2001). Data limitations 
prevent me from exploring this issue in detail here (although I present some preliminary 
findings on civil society above and single-party governments in the appendix), but future 
work may want to analyze the impact of populist grass-roots movements, junior coalition 
partners, and opposition parties on the environment thoroughly. In this context, a general 
discussion of the quality of the populism data I use may seem warranted (see also Wuttke et 
al. 2020). On one hand, the GPD (Hawkins et al. 2019) is the only time-series cross-sectional 
data set covering a large number of countries and years while seeking to code all elements of 
populism as thoroughly as possible. On the other hand, the focus on leaders is based on a 
series of assumptions and future data compilations may seek to address populism of other 
actors and entities, e.g., party platforms. Consider here, for instance, the Populism and 
Political Parties Expert Survey by Meijers and Zaslove (2020), which covers up to 250 
political parties in 28 European countries. The shortcoming of these data is, however, that 
they only capture parties that were represented in parliament in 2017/2018. That is, these data 
are not time varying. 
 
Third, the argument I have developed is based on two interrelated, yet different mechanisms. 
Experimental or more qualitative work could try to disentangle the two processes, arguably 
shedding light on which one is more influential. Fourth, the available data coverage dictates 
my spatio-temporal scope: while my analyses are based on 66 countries between 1994 and 
2016 and, thus, I can generalize the findings obtained, additional data-compilation efforts are 
in need to get more information about populism and populist leadership in further countries 
and years as well. Fifth, I concentrate on the impact of populism on environmental 
performance, and this relationship between politics and the environment is likely to become 
more salient as the latter deteriorates. This implies, in turn, that the direction of influence may 
vary. In fact, recent research strongly points to a simultaneous relationship between these 
 
7 Emissions, population, and GDP per capita may be characterized by an upward trend in most countries. 
However, the inclusion or exclusion of population or income do not affect the results, while I have replaced the 
outcome variable by alternatives that are arguably less affected by trending in the appendix. Finally, the 
Arrelano-Bond estimator (also in the appendix) further addresses issues surrounding autocorrelation, 




factors (e.g., Bakaki et al. 2020) and examining this in greater detail than I can do here seems 
like an important avenue for future work. Finally, while I sought to examine some conditional 
influences and scope conditions of my argument via the analysis summarized in Table 2, 
other, perhaps more influential intervening effects exist. Future studies may want to uncover 
these and further shed light on the impact of populism on environmental politics.    
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Populism and Environmental Performance – Appendix 
 
This appendix summarizes a series of additional models that further support the main article’s 
findings. These include: 
 I considered term fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable. 
 
 I replaced the standard errors by panel-corrected ones. 
 
 I re-estimated the main model using random effects in a regular OLS setup and use 
the Arrelano-Bond estimator. 
 
 I model a curvilinear effect stemming from income. 
 
 I replaced the dependent variable by alternatives, i.e., a variable capturing 
environmental policy outputs and a measure on efficiency. 
 
 I include a variable on veto players. 
 
 I jackknifed the standard errors. 
 
 Using a binary variable on single-party governments, I study a moderating impact 
on the effect of populism. 
 
 I also explore whether there is a moderating influence stemming from regime type. 
 
























Different Model Specifications 
 
The main text’s analysis is based on multi-level models with year fixed effects and random 
intercepts for leaders. This approach not only acknowledges for the hierarchical nature of the 
data and corresponding dependencies across levels, but also addresses influences stemming 
from unobserved factors. While this comprehensively deals with confounding factors, I also 
considered other specifications. First, I additionally include fixed effects for leaders’ terms to 
control for unobserved, time-invariant term determinants (Model 1).  Second, I also include a 
one-year lagged dependent variable to capture path dependencies in the outcome variable 
(Model 2). Third, I estimate Prais-Winsten regression with heteroskedastic panels corrected 
standard errors and a one-year autocorrelation process instead of the multi-level model 
(Model 3). Panel-level heteroskedastic errors address country-specific idiosyncrasies. Fourth, 
I use random effects in a regular OLS setup (Model 4). And, fifth, I employ the Arellano-
Bond estimator, which contains both the levels and the first difference equations to account 
for trending in the data. Models 1-5 in this appendix, which are all based on Model 3 of the 
main text, summarize these additional models and show that the main effect remains robust: 
populism is positively related to CO2 emissions and, hence, detrimental for the environment. 
 
Table A1. 
Robustness Checks: Varying Model Specifications 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Lagged Dependent Variable   0.987    
  (0.011)***    
Populism Score  0.115  0.027  0.217  0.137  0.165 
 (0.042)*** (0.015)* (0.091)** (0.057)** (0.099)* 
Population (ln)  0.070 -0.000  0.061  0.070  0.048 
 (0.032)** (0.005) (0.025)** (0.032)** (0.035) 
GDP per capita (ln)  0.553  0.002  0.669  0.569  0.693 
 (0.033)*** (0.010) (0.036)*** (0.038)*** (0.039)*** 
Democracy  0.001 -0.000 -0.043 -0.005 -0.053 
 (0.010) (0.001) (0.011)*** (0.009) (0.016)*** 
Constant -4.061 -0.030 -4.576 -4.164 -5.491 
  (0.535)*** (0.085) (0.471)*** (0.685)*** (0.605)*** 




Random Intercept Yes Yes No Yes No 
Term Fixed Effects Yes No No No No 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (two-
tailed). 
 
Curvilinear Effect from Income 
 
In the main text’s models, I merely included an income variable without any further 
alterations. Much of the literature, however, models a curvilinear effect in order to capture 
what is commonly known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve: environmental quality first 
decreases until a tipping point is reached, after which environmental performance improves 
with higher development – and income. In order to mode this in my setup, I have added a 
squared income term to the main text’s Model 3 and re-run the estimation. While the main 
result remains robust, I find no evidence for a curvilinear effect. 
 
Table A2. 
Robustness Checks: Curvilinear Effect from Income 
 
 Model 6 
Populism Score  0.124 
 (0.040)*** 
Population (ln)  0.070 
 (0.032)** 
GDP per capita (ln)  0.463 
 (0.231)** 





  (1.178)*** 
N 205 
Random Intercept Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Note: Standard errors clustered on leaders in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% (two-tailed). 
 
Alternative Dependent Variables 
 
Böhmelt et al. (2018) emphasize that several variables have been used in the literature to 
capture environmental quality. These items, although addressing the same, underlying 
concept, do serve different purposes and no single measure is ideal for all circumstances. To 
this end, I assess the robustness of my main finding using two different dependent variables 
that differ from the measure used in the main text. First, I employ the carbon-efficiency 
measure from Böhmelt et al. (2018) as another outcome-variable alternative. This variable, 
called Environmental Input Efficiency captures countries’ distance from the carbon emission 
efficiency frontier, benchmarking them against comparable states. In other words, I address 




economically developed and are no more advantaged in terms of technological possibilities. 
Environmental Input Efficiency thus measures whether states have fully exploited possibilities 
for progress on climate change in the short to medium term.  
 
I use data from the World Bank Development Indicators again to capture carbon emissions in 
kilotons per capita and to obtain a measure of per-capita GDP. Under the order-alpha 
approach, a given country is efficient if no more than 5 percent of other countries in the 
comparator group have (or had) lower carbon emissions, i.e. the comparator at the 95th 
percentile for low emissions per capita is the benchmark for calculating efficiency in the year 
concerned. Environmental Input Efficiency is the ratio of CO2 emissions per capita of the 
benchmark to those of the country under study. These scores capture a state’s distance from 
the carbon efficiency frontier, e.g., inefficient countries receive scores below 1. 
 
Second, I make use of the policy output data from Anderson et al. (2017). Hence, I now 
depart from the outcome level and focus on legislative action of state executives. The output-
level dependent variable captures the number of energy-efficient policies in force up to a 
given year. 
 
Third, following, e.g., Ward (2006), I examine a measure for sustainability and ecological 
footprint. The ecological footprint refers to the area (per capita) that is necessary to sustain 
current patterns of resource use (Lin et al. 2019). The data are available from 
www.footprintnetwork.org and I focus on the ecological footprint of consumption, i.e., the 
sum of Footprint of production and imports associated with product or waste minus the 
footprint of exports associated with product or waste. The variable captures the ecological 
footprint in standardized global hectares. I log-transform this item and higher values pertain to 
a larger footprint or a lower environmental performance (see also Wiedmann et al. 2006). 
 
Table A3 summarizes the corresponding findings. In Model 7, I use Environmental Input 
Efficiency, while Model 8 concentrates on the output-level dependent variable. In Model 9, 
Ecological Footprint (ln) is the outcome variable. In Models 7-8, the populism score is now 
negatively signed – which is expected as higher values stand for more environmental-friendly 
behavior either in terms of efficiency or outputs here. In Model 9 of Table A3, Populism 
Score is negatively signed, as larger values of Ecological Footprint (ln) are associated with 
lower sustainability and environmental performance. The core variable is significant at 
conventional levels in Table A3, thus emphasizing that my results are robust.  
 
Table A3. 
Robustness Checks: Alternative Dependent Variables 
 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Populism Score -0.167 -6.187  0.078 
 (0.075)** (2.067)*** (0.035)** 
Population (ln) -0.050  4.280 -0.033 
 (0.018)*** (0.768)*** (0.016)** 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.098 10.176  0.392 
 (0.032)*** (1.468)*** (0.021)*** 
Democracy  0.004  0.126 -0.001 
 (0.012) (0.280) (0.006) 
Constant  2.015 -156.89 -1.519 
  (0.429)*** (17.032)*** (0.292)*** 




Random Intercept Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: Standard errors clustered on leaders in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 




I discussed veto players and political constraints in the main text, but do not explicitly control 
for these there. In Model 10 of this appendix, I thus add the political constraints variable from 
Henisz (2000). As demonstrated there, however, neither does the variable achieve statistical 




Robustness Checks: Veto Players 
 
 Model 10 
Populism Score  0.122 
 (0.042)*** 
Veto Players -0.047 
 (0.182) 
Population (ln)  0.100 
 (0.029)*** 
GDP per capita (ln)  0.468 
 (0.056)*** 
State Capacity -0.194 
 (0.068)*** 









  (0.723)*** 
N 192 
Random Intercept Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Note: Standard errors clustered on leaders in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% (two-tailed). 
 
Jackknifing the Standard Errors 
 
As discussed in the main text, some of the sample countries are characterized by low within 
variation. To address this issue, I jackknifed the standard errors of the coefficients from my 








Robustness Checks: Jackknifing the Standard Errors 
 
 Model 11 
Populism Score  0.165 
 (0.101)* 
Population (ln)  0.048 
 (0.028)* 





  (0.523)*** 
N 205 
Random Intercept Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes 
 






The GPD only cover heads of government and, for example, junior coalition partners or 
opposition parties are not coded. However, we know that these can influence environmental 
politics as well (see, e.g., Carter 2013; Van Der Heijden 2002) and there are many cases of 
populist parties included in coalition governments. My analyses thus cannot assess the impact 
of a populist party that did not control the executive, but still exerted considerable influence 
over policy via coalition bargaining. Data limitations prevent me from a thorough analysis, 
but I compiled data on single-party governments and created a binary variable (0 for coalition 
governments in a given year) using Döring and Manow (2012). In turn, I interact this 
dichotomous variable with Populism Score. Table A6 and Figure A1 summarize the 
corresponding findings. 
 
The interaction in Model 12 of this appendix is negative and significant. When plotting the 
marginal effects of Populism Score in light of these results, however, there is little evidence 
for a major influence. That is, the positive effect of Populism Score on emissions remains 
robust regardless of whether we look at single-party or coalition governments. The influence 
is more strongly pronounced for the latter (i.e., when Single-Party Government = 0) as I 
obtain a point estimate of 0.2. The marginal effect estimate for single-party governments is 
smaller (0.086), but the confidence intervals do slightly overlap. Hence, my main result is 










Robustness Checks: Moderation via Single-Party Government 
 
 Model 12 
Populism Score  0.200 
 (0.060)*** 
Single-Party Government  0.085 
 (0.048)* 
Populism Score * Single-Party Government -0.114 
 (0.040)*** 
Population (ln)  0.100 
 (0.028)*** 
GDP per capita (ln)  0.477 
 (0.062)*** 
State Capacity -0.194 
 (0.076)** 









  (0.720)*** 
N 190 
Random Intercept Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Note: Standard errors clustered on leaders in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 












Figure A1.  
Effect of Populism on Environmental Outcomes Moderated by Single-Party Government 
 
Note: Graph prepared by author; dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval. 
 
Interaction with Regime Type 
 
The democracy variable I employ (the polity2 score from the Polity IV data set) is 
characterized by some temporal and cross-sectional variance over the time period of my 
analysis. It has been suggested populist leaders may be able to exert a stronger impact when a 
polity approaches forms of authoritarianism. Such a mechanism would be consistent with my 
claim about checks and balances, and I examine this in the following via a multiplicative 
interaction between Populism Score and Democracy. Table A7 and Figure A2 present the 
results. 
 
A direct interpretation is somewhat more challenging than in the previous model, as 
Democracy is not binary and the interaction term is statistically insignificant. That said, 
Populism Score is positively signed and significant at conventional levels, while the estimate 
of 0.18 captures the marginal effect of Populism Score when holding Democracy at 0 (which 
is commonly defined as an anocracy). A more substantive interpretation of the interaction is 
given by Figure A2, which plots the impact of Populism Score on emissions for the different 
values of Democracy. In essence, there is little evidence for a moderating influence of 
democratic forms of government and, in fact, a positive effect of populism is given for all 
values of Democracy (albeit with insignificant point estimates at very low and high levels of 
that variable). These results imply, although more thorough analyses are necessary in the 
future, that the second mechanism on checks and balances I develop in the main text may be 
less crucial than the first one; and they further emphasize that populism could be a missing 






Robustness Checks: Moderation via Democracy 
 
 Model 13 
Populism Score  0.180 
 (0.089)** 
Populism Score * Democracy -0.011 
 (0.011) 
Population (ln)  0.103 
 (0.029)*** 
GDP per capita (ln)  0.467 
 (0.059)*** 
State Capacity -0.223 
 (0.064)*** 









  (0.699)*** 
N 190 
Random Intercept Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Note: Standard errors clustered on leaders in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 






Figure A2.  
Effect of Populism on Environmental Outcomes Moderated by Democracy 
Note: Graph prepared by author; dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval 
 
 
Controlling for Fossil Fuel Production 
 
The emissions of countries are influenced by a series of factors, which I try to control for as 
comprehensively and parsimoniously as possible. One determinant not considered so far, 
however, may we fossil fuel production. I focus on fossil fuel energy consumption as a 
percentage of total energy consumption. The data are taken from the World Bank 
Development Indicators, which derives the information from the International Energy 
Agency. The theoretical rationale behind this indicator is similar to Manufacturing: a higher 
level of fossil fuel consumption is a proxy for a strong and influential coal and oil industry 
lobby, and quite a few more populist leaders have played to these in the recent past. 
 
As expected, Fossil Fuel Consumption is positively signed and statistically significant. This 
mirrors, e.g., Fredriksson and Gaston (2000) who use a similar measure to proxy industry 
lobby strength. Crucially for my argument, however, Populism Score remains robust as it is 









Robustness Checks: Fossil Fuel Consumption 
 
 Model 14 
Populism Score  0.115 
 (0.051)** 
Population (ln)  0.046 
 (0.025)* 
GDP per capita (ln)  0.402 
 (0.051)*** 
State Capacity -0.097 
 (0.073) 




Fossil Fuel Consumption  0.014 
 (0.003)*** 








  (0.604)*** 
N 193 
Random Intercept Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Note: Standard errors clustered on leaders in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 




Anderson, Brilé, Tobias Böhmelt, and Hugh Ward. 2017. Public Opinion and Environmental 
Policy Output: A Cross-National Analysis of Energy Policies in Europe. Environmental 
Research Letters 12 (11): 114011. 
Böhmelt, Tobias, Farzad Vaziri, and Hugh Ward. 2018. Does Green Taxation Drive Countries 
Towards the Carbon Efficiency Frontier? Journal of Public Policy 38 (4): 481-509. 
Carter, Neil. 2013. Greening the Mainstream: Party Politics and the Environment. 
Environmental Politics 22 (1): 73-94. 
Döring, Holger, and Philip Manow. 2012. Parliament and Government Composition 
Database (ParlGov): An Infrastructure for Empirical Information on Parties, Elections, 
and Governments in Modern Democracies. Available online: http://parlgov.org/. 
Fredriksson, Per G., and Noel Gaston. 2000. Ratification of the 1992 Climate Change 
Convention: What Determines Legislative Delay? Public Choice 104 (3-4): 345-368. 
Henisz, Witold J. 2000. The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth. Economics & 
Politics 12 (1): 1-31. 
Lin, David, Laurel Hanscom, Jon Martindill, Michael Borucke, Lea Cohen, Alessandro Galli, 
Elias Lazarus, Golnar Zokai, Katsunori Iha, and Mathis Wackernagel. 2019. Working 
Guidebook to the National Footprint and Biocapacity Accounts. Oakland: Global Footprint 
Network. 
Van Der Heijden, Hein-Anton. 2002. Political Parties and NGOs in Global Environmental 
Politics. International Political Science Review 23 (2): 187-201. 
Wiedmann, Thomas, Jan Minx, John Barrett, and Mathis Wackernagel. 2006. Allocating 
Ecological Footprints to Final Consumption Categories with Input-Output Analysis. 
Ecological Economics 56 (1): 28-48. 
 
